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The human impact of U.S. immigration law cannot be 
overstated. Each person who faces deportation has a story. She 
might be an undocumented mother who is a primary caregiver for a 
young U.S. citizen daughter who suffers from a life-threatening 
disease. He may be a teenager who aspires to work as a doctor and 
who was brought to the United States as a baby without any 
knowledge about his immigration status. He may be a middle-aged 
man who has faced hardship in his birthplace and a jail sentence in 
the US but whose dream is to provide for his family and teach his 
own children about the value of hard work.  
 
Deportation can hand these people cruel and unusual fates, 
which can also damage the souls of those who are left behind. 
Prosecutorial discretion is a powerful sword because it empowers 
the government to decide this fate for thousands of people and their 
families.1 The visibility of prosecutorial discretion during President 
Obama’s Administration might leave the impression that policies 
like DACA and DAPA are something new or perhaps an 
undiscovered tool in the toolbox, but history tells a different story. 
As detailed in my book, Beyond Deportation: The Role of 
Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Cases, prosecutorial 
discretion, and deferred action in particular, has been used for 
decades to protect thousands of individuals and families based on 
                                                          
* Samuel Weiss Faculty Scholar and Clinical Professor of Law at Penn State Law-
University Park. This article is based on a talk delivered on November 9, 2015, at 
the University of Cincinnati School of Law, http://www.law.uc.edu/journals/inlr. 
Portions of this article are drawn from my book, BEYOND DEPORTATION: THE 
ROLE OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN IMMIGRATION CASES published by NYU 
Press in 2015; my article, The History of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration 
Law, 64 AM. U.L. REV. 1285 (2015), and various blogs written about the case of 
United States v. Texas. I would like to thank Ming Hsu Chen, and Amanda Frost 
for their feedback on this Article. I also thank Lauren Holzer (’16), Meaghan 
McGinnis (’17) and the Immigration and Nationality Law Review for their 
research and editorial assistance.  
1 SHOBA SIVAPRASAD WADHIA, BEYOND DEPORTATION: THE ROLE OF 
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN IMMIGRATION CASES, 146-147. (New York 
University Press 2015). 
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primarily on humanitarian reasons. 
 
In this article, I place the Supreme Court case of United 
States v. Texas into a broader context by describing the history and 
legal authority for prosecutorial discretion in immigration law and 
highlighting the contents and recommendations in my book, Beyond 
Deportation: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration 
Cases.  Part I of this article offers a primer on the role of 
prosecutorial discretion in immigration law and also describes two 
related programs announced by President Obama on November 20, 
2014 and the subject of litigation for nearly two years as of this 
writing. Part II provides a history and analysis of United States v. 
Texas, a lawsuit originally brought by the state of Texas and twenty-
five other states and decided on June 23, 2016.2 This section offers 
highlights from the oral arguments held at the U.S. Supreme Court 
and my position on the sounder arguments. Part III raises normative 
questions about the implementation, legitimacy, and continued 
enforcement of immigration law against “priorities” identified by 
the government. Part IV discusses my book Beyond Deportation, 
which includes a history about discretion, my efforts to obtain data 
about the individuals who receive discretion and recommendations 
moving forward.  
 
I. Overview of Prosecutorial Discretion in 
Immigration Law  
 
“Prosecutorial discretion” in immigration law refers to the 
decision the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) makes about 
whether to enforce the immigration law against a person or a group 
of persons.3 When prosecutorial discretion is exercised favorably 
                                                          
2 United States v. Texas, 579 U.S. _ (2016) (per curiam). 
3 Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Policies for the 
Apprehension, Detention and Removal of Undocumented Immigrants (Nov. 20, 
2014), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_ 
prosecutorial_discretion.pdf [hereinafter Johnson Memo re: Policies]; John 
Morton, Dir. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion 
36 IMMGR. & NAT’LITY L. REV. 94 (2015). 
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towards a person, the government abstains from bringing a legally 
valid immigration charge against a person or group of persons. 
There are three theories behind the use of prosecutorial discretion in 
the immigration context. The first theory is economic and 
recognizes that the government only has the resources to deport less 
than 400,000 people a year, or less than four percent of the 
deportable population.4 The second theory is humanitarian in nature 
and recognizes that there are people residing in the United States 
who have compelling equities like a high school diploma or a 
serious medical condition who should be protected from removal.5 
A political third factor is the relationship between congressional 
inaction and public demands for an administrative solution.6 
Congress has failed to pass a comprehensive immigration reform 
bill in more than twenty years, despite the fact that several bipartisan 
bills have been debated during this time period.7 
                                                          
Consistent with the Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for 
the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens (June 17, 2011), 
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-
memo.pdf [hereinafter Morton 7/11 Memo].   
4 See The Dep’t of Homeland Sec.’s Auth. to Prioritize Removal of Certain Aliens 
Unlawfully Present in the United States and to Defer Removal of Others, 38 Op. 
O.L.C. (2014),  
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/attachments/2014/11/20/
2014-11-19-auth-prioritize-removal.pdf [hereinafter DHS Authorization of 
Priority Removal]; see also John Morton, Dir. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Civil 
Immigration Enforcement: Priorities for the Apprehension, Detention, and 
Removal of Aliens (Mar. 2, 2011), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/prosecutorial-
discretion/civil-imm-enforcement-priorities_app-detn-reml-aliens.pdf 
[hereinafter Morton 3/11 Memo].  
5 Shoba Sivaprasad Wadia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration 
Law, 9 U. CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 243, 244-45 (2010). 
6 Wadhia, supra note 1, at 8. 
7 See, e.g., Rachel Weiner, How immigration reform failed, over and over, WASH. 
POST (Jan. 30, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
fix/wp/2013/01/30/how-immigration-reform-failed-over-and-over/; RUTH ELLEN 
WASEM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42980, BRIEF HISTORY OF COMPREHENSIVE 
IMMIGRATION REFORM EFFORTS IN THE 109TH AND 110TH CONGRESSES TO 
INFORM POLICY DISCUSSIONS IN THE 113TH CONGRESS 2-5 (2013); ANDORRA 
BRUNO ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44230, IMMIGRATION LEGISLATION 
36 IMMGR. & NAT’LITY L. REV. 94 (2015). 
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Embracing all three theories of prosecutorial discretion was 
the announcement by President Obama on November 20, 2014 to 
use prosecutorial discretion to protect young people and families 
from deportation. The two most controversial of these actions 
pertain to two deferred action programs.   
 
One program announced by the President was an expansion 
to the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, a 
program established in 2012 that enables young people to apply for 
deferred action if they are in school, came to the United States before 
the age of sixteen, and meet other program requirements.8 Those 
granted DACA are eligible to apply for work authorization and, if 
granted DACA, are protected from removal for a period of two 
                                                          
AND ISSUES IN THE 114TH CONGRESS 2-26 (2016); see generally Shoba Sivaprasad 
Wadhia, Immigration: Mind over Matter, 5 U. MD, L.J. RACE RELIG. GENDER & 
CLASS 243 (2005).  
8 Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), U.S. 
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVICES,  
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/consideration-deferred-action-childhood-
arrivals-daca (last updated Jan. 4, 2016). The specific requirements of the 2012 
DACA program, are as follows:  
1. Were under the age of 31 as of June 15, 2012; 
2. Came to the United States before reaching your 16th birthday; 
3. Have continuously resided in the United States since June 15, 2007, up 
to the present time; 
4. Were physically present in the United States on June 15, 2012, and at the 
time of making your request for consideration of deferred action with 
USCIS; 
5. Had no lawful status on June 15, 2012; 
6. Are currently in school, have graduated or obtained a certificate of 
completion from high school, have obtained a general education 
development (GED) certificate, or are an honorably discharged veteran 
of the Coast Guard or Armed Forces of the United States; and 
7. Have not been convicted of a felony, significant misdemeanor, or three 
or more other misdemeanors, and do not otherwise pose a threat to 
national security or public safety.  Id.  
36 IMMGR. & NAT’LITY L. REV. 94 (2015). 
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years.9 The changes announced on November 20, 2014 to DACA 
(referred to in this article as “DACA Plus” or "expanded DACA") 
would adjust the entry date from June 15, 2007 to January 1, 2010 
and would also remove the age limit in the original 2012 program.10 
These changes would allow qualifying individuals to apply for 
DACA regardless of their age if they show continuous residence 
since January 1, 2010. Cris is one individual who could qualify for 
DACA Plus if it were not held up in litigation:   
 
Cris: Cris was born in the Philippines and arrived in 
the United States at the age of 6, but missed the 
original cut-off for DACA by one year. Cris is the 
founder of an award-winning start-up company, 
GrantAnswers, which helps low-income and first 
generation students secure academic and career 
opportunities. Cris founded this company after 
helping students earn more than one million dollars 
in grants and scholarships for college. He is also 
developing a career readiness mobile application 
called KeyJargon. He holds a Bachelor’s degree in 
Psychology and a Master’s degree in Criminal 
Justice from the City University of New York, and 
has nearly completed his PhD. Despite his 
professional successes, Cris remains undocumented. 
The implementation of expanded DACA would 
alleviate his and his family’s concerns that he may be 
deported. Through expanded DACA, Cris would be 
                                                          
9 Janet Napolitano, Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Exercising Prosecutorial 
Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children 
(June 15, 2012), https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-
prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf.  
10 Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Exercising 
Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United 
States as Children and with Respect to Certain Individuals Who Are the Parents 
of U.S. Citizens or Permanent Residents (Nov. 20, 2014), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_deferred_a
ction.pdf [hereinafter Johnson Memo re: Prosecutorial Discretion]. 
36 IMMGR. & NAT’LITY L. REV. 94 (2015). 
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able to continue his doctoral studies, the funding for 
which was revoked due to his immigration status, 
and pursue additional career opportunities in public 
service helping youth and marginalized groups.11  
 
The second program establishes a new Deferred Action for 
Parents of American and Legal Residents program (DAPA). DAPA 
would enable undocumented parents to request deferred action and 
work authorization if they can show 1) continuous residence since 
January 1, 2010; 2) a relationship as the parent to a U.S. citizen or 
lawful permanent resident child born on or before November 20, 
2014; 3) unlawful status on November 20, 2014 and on the date of 
application; 4) they are not an enforcement priority for removal; and 
5) they warrant protection as a matter of discretion.12  It is estimated 
that sixty-nine percent of persons eligible for DAPA have resided in 
the United States for ten years or more.13 The human impact of 
                                                          
11 Brief for American Immigration Council et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners, United States v. State of Texas, No. 15-674 (Mar. 8, 2016), 2016 U.S. 
S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1154. Significantly, the 2012 DACA program has 
transformed the lives of more than half a million people as data from DHS 
confirms that more than 700,000 initial requests for DACA have been approved. 
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals Process (Through Fiscal Year 2016, 2nd 
Qtr), U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVICES, 
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Resources/Reports%20and%20
Studies/Immigration%20Forms%20Data/All%20Form%20Types/DACA/I821d_
performancedata_fy2016_qtr2.pdf (last visited June 11, 2016). To illustrate the 
impact and diversity of those who have benefited from DACA 2012, consider the 
story of Ji In (Kit) Lee a college student in Los Angeles, California who came to 
the United States with her mother from Korea when she was 5-years-old. See 
Community Stories: Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), WHITE 
HOUSE INITIATIVE ON ASIAN AM. & PAC. ISLANDERS, http://sites.ed.gov 
/aapi/community-stories/#DeferredActionforChildhoodArrivals (last visited June 
11, 2016). Says Kit,“DACA has opened up so many opportunities for me—school, 
scholarships, and work. But it’s also brought my family a sense of certainty, which 
has had real effects on our daily lives. The fact that my mom doesn’t have to worry 
about me being deported. We breathe a little easier today because of DACA.” Id.  
12 Johnson Memo re: Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 10. 
13 Randy Capps et al., Deferred Action for Unauthorized Immigrant Parents: 
Analysis of DAPA’s Potential Effects on Families and Children, MIGRATION 
36 IMMGR. & NAT’LITY L. REV. 94 (2015). 
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DAPA is compelling, as it would protect individuals with significant 
roots in the United States from deportation and make them eligible 
to apply for employment authorization. Alina is one example of a 
person who would qualify for DAPA if the program were 
operational:  
 
Dr. Alina Kipchumba:. Dr. Alina Kipchumba, a 
citizen of Kenya, came to the United States in 1995 
to begin a Ph.D. program. In 2002, she obtained a 
Ph.D. in Biological Sciences from the University of 
Illinois in Chicago. For six years she had work 
authorization, and she was employed at the 
University of South Florida and then at the Sarasota 
Christian School. Dr. Kipchumba’s 11-year-old son, 
a U.S. citizen, was born with a serious heart 
condition and has undergone multiple open-heart 
surgeries. Her son’s pediatric cardiologist warned 
her that it would be impossible for her son to receive 
the medical treatment he requires in Kenya and that 
returning to Kenya would be “a death sentence” for 
him. DAPA would enable Dr. Kipchumba to once 
again have work authorization, resume working as a 
teacher, and support her U.S. citizen child.14 
 
Also on November 20, 2014, President Obama published a 
new priorities memorandum setting forth refined priorities for 
immigration enforcement. The new priorities for enforcement are in 
descending order: 1) threats to national security, border security and 
public safety, including many felony convictions and those 
convicted of an aggravated felony; 2) misdemeanants and new 
immigration violators, including recent entrants and those convicted 
                                                          
POL’Y INST. (Feb. 2016), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/deferred-
action-unauthorized-immigrant-parents-analysis-dapas-potential-effects-
families.  
14 Brief for American Immigration Council et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners, supra note 11.  
36 IMMGR. & NAT’LITY L. REV. 94 (2015). 
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of a “significant misdemeanor”; and 3) “other” immigration 
violations including people who received a final order of removal 
on or after January 1, 2014.15 Any person who fits within these 
priorities is disqualified from DAPA.16 The breadth of the priorities 
memorandum illustrates that adults and children without a criminal 
history can fall within a priority category. This memo also provides 
a revised policy on prosecutorial discretion for DHS and lists more 
than one dozen types of prosecutorial discretion in immigration law 
such as the issuance and cancellation of a Notice to Appear (the 
DHS charging document against a noncitizen alleged to be in 
violation of the immigration laws); a choice by DHS to refrain from 
arrest or interrogation of an individual; a choice by DHS not to file 
an appeal where an Immigration Judge has granted relief to the 
noncitizen and choices to grant deferred action, parole or a stay of 
removal, among others.17 Finally, the memo grapples with the more 
complicated cases that may involve a person who appears to be a 
priority but whose equities may instead warrant a favorable exercise 
of prosecutorial discretion.18 For example, a person who recently 
entered the United States unlawfully and therefore is potentially 
eligible for “Priority 2” may also be a mother to children born in the 
United States for whom she is the primary caregiver and 
breadwinner. Arguably, this person should not be treated as an 
enforcement priority in light of the equities present in her case.  
 
 
 
 
II. United States v. Texas: The Litigation  
 
a. Procedural History  
 
                                                          
15 Johnson Memo re: Policies, supra note 3. 
16 Johnson Memo re: Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 10. 
17 Johnson Memo re: Policies, supra note 3. 
18 Id. 
36 IMMGR. & NAT’LITY L. REV. 94 (2015). 
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United States v. Texas originates from a lawsuit brought by 
the state of Texas and twenty-five other states challenging the 
legality of DAPA and DACA Plus.19 On February 16, 2015, Judge 
Andrew S. Hanen of the Federal District Court in Brownsville, TX 
halted the new deferred action programs through a tool called 
preliminary injunction, after concluding that the plaintiffs had 
standing and should have placed the deferred action programs 
through “notice and comment rulemaking” under the Administrative 
Procedure Act.20 The 123-page opinion contained 
misrepresentations about immigration law and policy, some of 
which were memorialized in another letter signed by 104 law 
professors.21 As one example, the letter criticizes Judge Hanen’s 
characterization of deferred action as lacking statutory authority and 
beyond the scope of prosecutorial discretion.22 Contrary to this 
characterization and as described below, the Administration has 
ample authority to operate a deferred action program.  
    
The Administration (represented by attorneys in the 
Department of Justice) appealed Judge Hanen’s decision to the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals. Oral arguments were heard on July 10, 
2015 and heard by a three-judge panel.23 The hearing displayed 
                                                          
19 Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 604 (S.D. Tex. 2015).  
20 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012). 
21 Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, supra note 19, at 604; Letter from 
Law Professors in Response to Preliminary Injunction on Executive Actions (Mar. 
13, 2015),  
https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/_file/LAWPROFLTRHANENFINAL.pdf 
[hereinafter Letter from Law Professors]. 
22 Letter from Law Professors, supra note 21. For a comprehensive account of the 
misstatements made by the district court, see Anil Kalhan, Deferred Action, 
Supervised Enforcement Discretion, and the Rule of Law Basis for Executive 
Action on Immigration, 63 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 58 (2015). 
23 Oral Argument, Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015) (No.15-
40238), http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/oral-argument-information/oral-argument-
recordings (search July 10, 2015 for State of Texas, et al. v. USA, et al.); Shoba 
Sivaprasad Wadhia, Immigration argument at the fifth circuit, THE HILL (July 14, 
2015, 4:00 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/judicial/247862-
immigration-argument-at-the-fifth-circuit. 
36 IMMGR. & NAT’LITY L. REV. 94 (2015). 
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great confusion around the terms lawful presence, deferred action, 
and employment authorization to name a few. As I expressed in 
earlier commentary:  
 
Mildly frustrating were the flaws made by the state 
of Texas like calling DAPA a change in law and 
pointing to the administration for failing to abide by 
the congressional statute. Absent from this argument 
was the statutory authority for prosecutorial 
discretion decisions by DHS like section 103(a) of 
the Immigration and Nationality Act and the 
additional legal authorities and history for deferred 
action in immigration law. Likewise, Texas argued 
that there is “no” statute or rule that allows the 
government to grant lawful presence and yet there is 
a clear definition for (un)lawful presence in 
immigration law and reams of guidance documents 
about how this statute should be applied. …One 
revealing aspect of the hearing was that no one party 
was in agreement about how the term “deferred 
action” would be defined -- perhaps this was 
intentional. During the argument, the scope and 
definition of deferred action was identified in at least 
four different ways: 1) deferred action was 
interchanged with all forms of prosecutorial 
discretion; 2) deferred action was interchanged with 
“lawful presence;” 3) deferred action was defined as 
foregoing removal proceedings; 4) deferred action 
was identified as one basis for work authorization 
under the regulations. The use of multiple and 
sometimes misleading definitions of deferred action 
at the hearing made it nearly impossible to have a 
meaningful discussion.24 
                                                          
24 Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Immigration argument at the fifth circuit, THE HILL 
(July 14, 2015, 4:00 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/judicial/247862-
immigration-argument-at-the-fifth-circuit. 
36 IMMGR. & NAT’LITY L. REV. 94 (2015). 
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Following this argument, a divided three-judge panel of the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a 135-page decision on 
November 9, 2015 in favor of the states.25 Policy and media 
commentators predicted the states would prevail in this lawsuit in 
part because of the composition of the panel. As described by the 
media outlet Politico “[T]he selection of [Judge] Smith — who 
wrote the opinion denying the administration’s request for an 
emergency stay — and [Judge] Elrod suggests Obama likely won’t 
have much luck winning the case at the Fifth Circuit, considered the 
most conservative appeals court in the nation.”26 Of note, Judge 
Carolyn King of the Fifth Circuit issued a sharp dissent that ran as 
long as the majority opinion.27  
 
On November 20, 2015, the Administration petitioned the 
U.S. Supreme Court to review the decision by the Fifth Circuit Court 
of Appeals.28 On January 19, 2016, the high court agreed to hear 
from parties on the following four questions:  
 
(1) Whether a state that voluntarily provides a 
subsidy to all aliens with deferred action has Article 
III standing and a justiciable cause of action under 
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to 
challenge the guidance seeking to establish a process 
                                                          
25 See Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), 
http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions%5Cpub%5C15/15-40238-CV0.pdf; see 
also Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Seeking to Understand the Fifth Circuit Ruling 
on Deferred Action, ACSBLOG (Nov. 11, 2015), https://www.acslaw.org/ 
acsblog/seeking-to-understand-the-fifth-circuit-ruling-on-deferred-action. 
26 Seung Min Kim, Obama’s Immigration Actions Face Skeptical Judges, 
POLITICO (June 29, 2015, 11:49 AM),  
http://www.politico.com/story/2015/06/obama-executive-action-immigration-
fifth-circuit-court-judges-119544#ixzz43x7gysXF. 
27 Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015) (King, J., dissenting).  
28 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, United States v. Texas, 579 U.S. __ (2016) (No. 
15-674), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/us-v-texas-
petition.pdf. 
36 IMMGR. & NAT’LITY L. REV. 94 (2015). 
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for considering deferred action for certain aliens 
because it will lead to more aliens having deferred 
action; (2) whether the guidance is arbitrary and 
capricious or otherwise not in accordance with law; 
(3) whether the guidance was subject to the APA’s 
notice-and-comment procedures; and (4) whether the 
guidance violates the Take Care Clause of the 
Constitution, Article II, section 3.”29   
 
Oral arguments were heard on April 18, 2016.30 The Supreme Court 
rendered a ruling on June 23, 2016.31 The ruling was essentially a 
non-decision as the justices split 4-4 offering nothing more than a 
nine word decision “[t]he judgment is affirmed by an equally 
divided Court.”32 The immediate implications of a 4-4 tie are that 
the decision by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals to block the 
DACA Plus and DAPA programs remain. As no reasoning or 
analysis was provided by the justices about the Supreme Court's 4-
4 split, the following analyzes the lower court decisions and oral 
arguments against these four questions and provides my take on 
which is the sounder argument.33 
 
b. Standing  
 
                                                          
29 United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 906 (2016). 
30 Transcript of Oral Argument, United States v. Texas, et al., 579 U.S. __ (2016) 
(No. 15-674),  
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/15-
674_h3dj.pdf. 
31 United States v. Texas, 579 U.S., supra note 2. 
32 See id.; see also Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Symposium: A meditation on 
history, law, and loss, SCOTUSBLOG (Jun. 23, 2016, 2:08 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/symposium-a-meditation-on-history-law-
and-loss/. 
33 Beyond the scope of this article is an analysis of the procedural landscape of 
the litigation moving forward. For a short piece on the possibilities, see: 
https://www.nilc.org/issues/immigration-reform-and-executive-actions/united-
states-v-state-of-texas/supreme-courts-tie-vote-means-dapa-daca/  
36 IMMGR. & NAT’LITY L. REV. 94 (2015). 
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 A threshold question in the case is whether Texas and the 
other twenty-five states have the right to bring a lawsuit in the first 
place. In order to have standing, the states would have to show they 
would suffer a direct and concrete injury.34 Standing originates from 
Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution, which allows for 
judicial power in “cases” and “controversies” involving the United 
States or States.35 In describing the standing doctrine Lyle 
Dinnerstein of the SCOTUS Blog reports:  
 
a state government — like anyone else who seeks to 
sue in those courts — would have to show that the 
action being challenged causes it a definite injury or 
harm.   The injury cannot be theoretical or 
speculative; it must be real, existing right now or 
predictably.  That is to assure that there is an actual 
“case or controversy,” as the Constitution 
demands.36  
 
The Administration argued that Texas is unable to show a concrete 
injury to themselves. Texas argued that it would suffer an injury by 
having to spend millions of dollars for noncitizens who are “lawfully 
present” and therefore eligible for a driver’s license under Texas’s 
law.37 To prove this, Texas argued that the average price for 
                                                          
34 Amanda Frost, Academic highlight: State standing and United States v. Texas, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 14, 2016, 11:29 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/ 
2016/04/academic-highlight-state-standing-and-united-states-v-texas/; Stephen 
Legomsky, Supreme Court Immigration Case Will Have Profound Impact, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 21, 2016, 6:24 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
stephen-legomsky/supreme-court-immigration_b_9044870.html.  
35 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
36 Lyle Denniston, Argument preview: A big, or not so big, ruling due on 
immigration, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 15, 2016, 9:07 AM),  
http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/04/argument-preview-a-big-or-not-so-big-
ruling-due-on-immigration/. 
37 Brief for Petitioner at 18-36, United States v. Texas et al., 579 U.S. __ (2016) 
(No. 15-674), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/15-
674tsUnitedStates.pdf. 
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processing a driver’s license is greater than the application fee. 
Importantly, any federal law or policy that benefits the foreign 
national is going to implicate states in some way.38  
 
 Throughout the litigation, Texas also argued that as a 
sovereign state it should be given ‘special solicitude’ in the standing 
analysis, citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. 
EPA39 as support.  In that case, the Court held that Massachusetts 
had standing to challenge the Environmental Protection Agency’s 
failure to regulate the emissions of four greenhouse gases under the 
Clean Air Act.40 Texas argued that “[t]o deny standing here, the 
Court would need to overrule Massachusetts and reject special 
solicitude for States in the standing analysis.”41 The United States 
argued that Texas should not be given “special solicitude” because 
unlike Massachusetts’ injury (erosion of coastal property), the harm 
alleged by Texas is avoidable.  Texas could charge more for its 
driver’s licenses so that it doesn’t lose money when providing them 
to deferred action recipients, or alternatively it could choose not to 
provide licenses to deferred action recipients.  As the United States 
explained in its reply brief to the Supreme Court, "[w]hen a state 
makes a voluntary choice to tie a state-law subsidy to another 
                                                          
38 Professor Stephen Legomsky has argued that Texas lacks standing and in 
testimony before the House Judiciary Committee noted: “If that is so, and if the 
mere fact that favorable immigration decisions by the federal immigration agency 
could have a net negative fiscal impact for a particular state were enough to confer 
standing, then the state in which a given noncitizen lives would have standing to 
challenge every individual grant of deferred action that is considered erroneous 
…The court’s logic would permit the state to challenge every grant of every 
immigration benefit that leads to eligibility for a driver’s license or any other state 
benefit. The Unconstitutionality of Obama’s Executive Actions on Immigration: 
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 28 (2015) (testimony 
of Stephen Legomsky, Professor, Washington University School of Law), 
https://lofgren.house.gov/uploadedfiles/legomsky_testimony. pdf.  
39 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
40 Id. at 526. 
41 Brief for Respondents at 34, United States v. Texas et al., 579 U.S.  __ (2016) 
(No. 15-674), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/ 
supreme_court_preview/briefs_2015_2016/15-674_resp.authcheckdam.pdf. 
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sovereign’s actions, the State does not thereby obtain standing 
to sue the other sovereign whenever the latter’s actions 
incidentally increase the cost of that subsidy."42   
 
c. Legality and Lawful Presence  
 
Throughout this litigation, the courts and plaintiff-states 
spent an inordinate amount of time discussing the President’s legal 
authority to use his discretion to operate a deferred action program. 
However, this legal authority is abundantly clear. The legal 
foundation for prosecutorial discretion can be found in the United 
States Constitution,43 the immigration statute created by Congress 
(INA),44 binding precedent from the U.S. Supreme Court,45 and 
regulations and policy documents from the DHS.46  In Arizona v. 
United States, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that: “A principal 
feature of the removal system is the broad discretion exercised by 
immigration officials. …Federal officials, as an initial matter, must 
decide whether it makes sense to pursue removal at all.”47 Congress 
has delegated the responsibility of administering and enforcing the 
immigration laws to the DHS. This delegation is explicit in section 
103 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA or The Act).48 
                                                          
42 It is an open question whether states may deny only some immigrants with 
deferred action from obtaining receive driver’s licenses. See e.g., ADAC v. 
Brewer, 818 F.3d 901 (9th Cir. 2016).  Importantly, this section is selective and 
does not cover every argument concerning standing in the Texas case. The author 
thanks scholar Amanda Frost for sharing this point and her insights for this 
paragraph. See Amanda Frost, supra note 34. For a nice analysis about the 
standing issues in Texas, see Tara Leigh Grove, When Can a State Sue the United 
States?, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 851 (2016). 
43 U.S. CONST., supra note 35. 
44 See e.g., Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1103 (2012). 
45 See e.g., Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrim. Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 483–84 
(1999). 
46 See e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14) (2016) (providing that deferred action 
recipients may apply for work authorization if they can show an “economic 
necessity for employment”). 
47 Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012).  
48 Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1103 (2012).  
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Similarly, section 242 of the Act prohibits judicial review for three 
specific prosecutorial discretion decisions (commencement of 
proceedings, adjudication of cases, and execution of removal 
orders), only reaffirming the delegation of prosecutorial discretion 
powers to DHS.49 Animating the statute are regulations, 
memoranda, and a long history of the agency using deferred action 
as a tool for placing low priority cases on the backburner. The 
regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 274.12(c)(14) was published more than 
twenty years ago and explicitly identifies “deferred action” as one 
basis for work authorization.50 The legality of these programs have 
also been upheld by the Department of Justice Office of Legal 
Counsel, DHS leadership, and more than 130 immigration law 
professors.51 
                                                          
49 Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2012).  
50 Seizure and Forfeiture of Conveyances, 8 C.F.R. § 274.12(c)(14) (2016).  
Beyond the scope of this article, but interesting to point out, is whether Texas et 
al. are really more concerned about the work authorization as opposed to the 
legality of deferred action. At one point during the oral arguments, Justice Elena 
Kagan asked the Texas Solicitor General, “it seems to me your real gripe here -- 
and you -- maybe it’s a real gripe -- your real grip here is to the work authorization 
piece the benefits pieces; is that right?” see Transcript of Oral Argument at 53, 
United States v. Texas, et al., 579 U.S. __ (2016) (No. 15-674), 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/15-
674_h3dj.pdf. She continued to probe whether the Texas Solicitor General should 
be attacking this regulation as opposed to the legality of deferred action itself.  Id. 
at 53-55. For more commentary on the relationship between work authorization 
and prosecutorial discretion, see Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Employment 
Authorization and Prosecutorial Discretion: The Case for Immigration 
Unexceptionalism, YALE J. ON REG. ONLINE (Feb. 10, 2016), 
http://www.yalejreg.com/blog/employment-authorization-and-prosecutorial-
discretion-the-case-for-immigration-unexceptionalism-by-s. See also Shoba 
Sivaprasad Wadhia, Demystifying Employment Authorization and Prosecutorial 
Discretion in Immigration Cases, 6 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 1 (2016); Shoba 
Sivaprasad Wadhia, U.S. v. Texas—True or False?, IMMIGR. PROF BLOG (Apr. 
19, 2016), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/2016/04/us-v-texas-
true-or-false-by-shoba-sivaprasad-wadhia.html. 
51 See Johnson Memo re: Policies, supra note 3; Johnson Memo re: Prosecutorial 
Discretion, supra note 10; DHS Authorization of Priority Removal, supra note 4. 
For a contrary view on the legality of these programs, raised only by a handful of 
scholars in contrast to the 135 plus who have supported their legality, see Jan C. 
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Despite this legal authority, the exchanges between the 
lawyers and the Justices on whether the deferred action programs 
are lawful persisted. In one portion of the argument, Justice Anthony 
Kennedy said, “the briefs go on for pages to the effect that the 
President has admitted a certain number of people and then 
Congress approves it. That seems to me to have it backwards. It’s as 
if—that the President is setting the policy and the Congress is 
executing it. That’s just upside down.” As I concluded in my earlier 
analysis of his argument:  
 
Justice Kennedy’s discomfort with the notion that the 
Executive Branch is dictating policy to the 
Legislative Branch is simply not the case here. In fact 
the Executive Branch’s discretionary authority to 
temporarily protect low priority people from 
deportation was at the direction of Congress which 
explicitly delegated the administration and 
enforcement of immigration laws to the Department 
of Homeland Security and has required, by statute, 
the Secretary of Homeland Security to establish 
immigration enforcement policies and priorities.52  
 
Another set of confusing exchanges during the litigation and 
continuing through the oral arguments centered on “lawful 
                                                          
Ting, U.S. Immigration Policy and President Obama’s Executive Order for 
Deferred Action, 66 SYRACUSE L. REV. 65 (2016) and Peter Margulies, DAPA 
and a Pragmatic View of Work Authorization and Family Fairness: Reply to 
Marty Lederman, IMMIGR. PROF BLOG (Apr. 21, 2016), 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/ 2016/04/dapa-and-a-pragmatic-
view-of-work-authorization-and-family-fairness-reply-to-marty-lederman.html. 
52 Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Understanding Justice Kennedy’s “Upside Down” 
Argument in U.S. v. Texas, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Apr. 20, 2016), 
http://immigrationimpact.com/2016/04/20/justice-kennedy-united-states-v-
texas/. For a comprehensive analysis about the OLC opinion see Adam B. Cox & 
Cristina M. Rodriguez, The President and Immigration Law Redux, 125 YALE 
L.J. 104 (2015). 
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presence” which Texas et al. marketed as a “transformation” of an 
unlawful status to a lawful one. This might leave the mistaken 
impression that lawful presence and deferred action are 
interchangeable or perhaps even more importantly that lawful 
presence and legal status are the same thing. As highlighted by more 
than 100 law professors and a chamber of legal scholars 
commenting after the oral arguments, persons deemed lawfully 
present remain without a legal status.53 Professor Anil Kalhan 
highlights the misconstruction around “lawful presence” and notes: 
“Properly understood, therefore, “lawful presence” should be 
regarded as a red herring in this litigation. To the extent that specific 
statutory provisions under federal, state, or local law make terms 
like “lawful presence” or “unlawful presence” relevant to particular 
legal consequences that might result for individuals who have been 
given notice of deferred action, those provisions operate collaterally 
and must be analyzed specifically and separately.”54  
 
While immigration scholars understand too well the rich 
distinctions between “lawful presence” and “lawful status,” the two 
terms remain an enigma for lawyers outside of this field. During oral 
arguments, Solicitor General Donald Verrelli reacted to a question 
about “lawful presence” in the following way: 
  
… [T]hat phrase, ‘lawful presence,’ has caused a 
terrible amount of confusion in this case; I realize it. 
But the reality is it means something different to 
people in the immigration world. What it means in 
the immigration world is not that you have a legal 
right to be in the United States, that your status has 
                                                          
53 See e.g., Letter from Law Professors, supra note 21; Anil Kalhan, Deferred 
Action, Supervised Enforcement Discretion, and the Rule of Law Basis for 
Executive Action on Immigration, 63 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 58 (2015); Anil 
Kalhan, DAPA, “Lawful Presence,” and the Illusion of a Problem, YALE J. ON 
REG. ONLINE (Feb. 12, 2016), http://www.yalejreg.com/blog/dapa-lawful-
presence-and-the-illusion-of-a-problem-by-anil-kalhan. 
54 Kalhan, DAPA, supra note 53.   
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changed in any way, that you have any defense to 
removal. It doesn’t mean any of those things, and it 
never has. And so at that fundamental level, we are 
not trying to change anybody’s legal status.55  
 
 The idea that legal terms of art can differ from the ordinary 
meaning of a phrase is neither novel nor specific to immigration law. 
New York Times columnist Linda Greenhouse stated with wit that 
“[i]t turns out that the phrase “lawful presence,” understood as a 
term embedded in the labyrinth of statutes, regulations and practice 
of immigration law, doesn’t have the obvious meaning it would have 
in everyday speech, namely that someone is in the country legally 
and has the right to remain here. Is that really so hard for two of the 
top lawyers in the United States to understand?”56 
 
d. Notice and Comment Rulemaking  
The third question raised by the high court (but receiving 
little attention during oral arguments) revolves around “notice and 
comment” rulemaking. The plaintiff-states argued that rulemaking 
is required under the APA. For certain rules, section 553 of the APA 
requires agencies to engage in “informal rulemaking,” where the 
government publishes a notice of the proposed rule and the parties 
then provide input primarily through the submission of written 
                                                          
55 Transcript of Oral Argument at 27, United States v. Texas, et al., 579 U.S. __ 
(2016) (No. 15-674), http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/ 
argument_transcripts/15-674_h3dj.pdf. 
56 Linda Greenhouse, When Smart Supreme Court Justices Play Dumb, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 28, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/28/opinion/when-
smart-supreme-court-justices-play-dumb.html?_r=0. For a history on how 
noncitizens with “lawful presence” have qualified for certain rights and benefits 
despite their unauthorized status and the erosion of these rights following the 1996 
immigration laws, see Sara N. Kominers, Caught in the Gap Between Status and 
No-Status: Lawful Presence Then and Now, 17 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 57 
(2016) (“The concept of conferring rights and benefits to lawfully present but out-
of-status noncitizens gained significant momentum in the 1970’s through the 
judicially created category of noncitizens who were ‘permanently residing under 
color of law’ (PRUCOL)”). 
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comment within a specified time period.57 Recognizing the value of 
agency control over internal procedure and the importance of 
efficiency, section 553 exempts "general statements of policy" from 
the notice and comment rulemaking requirement.58  The Supreme 
Court has held that "general statements of policy" include agencies' 
announcements as to how they plan to exercise discretionary powers 
going forward.59 
 In the memorandum announcing DAPA, the Secretary of 
Homeland Security explicitly instructed the USCIS officers to 
assess the facts of each individual case and to exercise discretion 
even in cases where all the threshold criteria – some of which are 
themselves discretionary – have been met.60  Texas et al. argued that 
this is a pretext – i.e. in practice, USCIS officials will be pressured 
into approving DAPA requests mechanically.61 To prove this, Texas 
relied on the low rate of denials among recipients of the earlier 
program, DACA 2012.62 This rationale is flawed. First, the DAPA 
program has discretion built into it as confirmed by the program’s 
actual requirement that the individual “present no other factors that, 
in the exercise of discretion, makes the grant of deferred action 
inappropriate.”63 Second, DACA requestors are a highly self-
selected group.64  Moreover, the DAPA program has not even 
begun, so there is no evidence to show that employees are not using 
discretion, assuming of course the test even rests on the discretion 
exercised by boots on the ground as opposed to the Secretary of 
DHS, a point reasonably questioned by scholar Michael Kagan.65  
                                                          
57 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012). 
58 Id. 
59 Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302 n.31 (1979). 
60 Johnson Memo re: Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 10. 
61 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 37, at 64. 
62 Id. at 63. 
63 Johnson Memo re: Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 10. 
64 The pool of DACA applicants is self-selected because the government has 
published guiding criteria that must be fulfilled in order to be eligible to apply.  
65 Michael Kagen, Binding the Enforcers: The Administrative Law Struggle 
Behind President Obama’s Immigration Actions, 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 665 (2016). 
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There is no basis for assuming that the DAPA approval rates will 
mimic those for DACA.  Under the states’ logic, I could determine 
whether my 5-year old is completing his homework based solely on 
my 8-year old’s completion rate. Importantly, every guidance 
document published by the immigration agency (INS and DHS) on 
prosecutorial discretion ranging from the 1976 memo by Sam 
Bernsen,66 1975 Operations Instruction,67 2000 Meissner Memo68 
and 2011 Morton memos69 have been in the form of policy 
documents and excepted from the notice and comment rulemaking 
requirement. As explained in a letter by 104 law professors in 
response to the district court opinion issued by Judge Andrew Hanen 
in this case, “[t]he mere existence of guiding criteria has not meant 
and does not with DAPA and DACA, mean that applications are 
merely rubberstamped.”70 In this way, the states have gravely 
mistaken an act of transparency for a violation of the law.71  
e. Take Care Clause  
 
Importantly, the Supreme Court requested briefing on the 
fourth question namely whether the deferred action programs violate 
the Take Care Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Almost absent from 
the oral arguments on April 18 was a discussion of this question. In 
my view, the Take Care Clause only supports the use of 
prosecutorial discretion. In its brief, Texas argued that DAPA 
                                                          
66 Sam Bersen, Gen. Counsel, Legal Opinion Regarding Service Exercise of 
Prosecutorial Discretion (Jul. 15, 1976),  
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/prosecutorial-discretion/service-exercise-pd.pdf. 
67 Id.; (Legacy) Immigration and Naturalization Service, Operations Instructions, 
O.I. § 103.1(a)(I)(ii) (1975).  
68 Doris Meissner, Comm’r, Immigration and Naturalization Serv., Exercising 
Prosecutorial Discretion (Nov. 17, 2000), 
http://www.legalactioncenter.org/sites/default/files/docs/lac/Meissner-2000-
memo.pdf [hereinafter Meissner Memo].   
69 Morton 3/11 Memo, supra note 4; Morton 7/11 Memo, supra note 3. 
70 Letter from Law Professors, supra note 21. 
71 The foregoing analysis originally appeared here: Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, 
Seeking to Understand the Fifth Circuit Ruling on Deferred Action, ACSBLOG 
(Nov. 11, 2015), https://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/all/shoba-sivaprasad-wadhia. 
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violates the Take Care Clause. Texas reasoned that DAPA declares 
conduct that Congress established as unlawful to be lawful.72 The 
Administration argued that a “Take Care question also is not 
justiciable, and respondents have no cause of action to raise such a 
claim. And in any event, the Secretary is faithfully executing the 
weighty and complex task of administering and enforcing the 
INA.”73 DHS has an obligation to both enforce the immigration laws 
against high priorities and exercise prosecutorial discretion 
favorably towards others-- this lies at the core of the Take Care 
Clause.74 This point was highlighted by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Heckler v. Chaney when it held that “[t]he decision of a prosecutor 
in the Executive Branch not to indict . . . has long been regarded as 
the special province of the Executive Branch, inasmuch as it is the 
Executive who is charged by the Constitution to ‘[T]ake Care that 
the Laws be faithfully executed.’”75 Possibly, if the President halted 
immigration enforcement altogether it would be in violation of the 
Take Care Clause, but that is not what we have seen during the 
President’s tenure. Instead, there have been a record number of 
deportations; two million during the first five years of his tenure 
alone.76 No one can really say the President has failed to enforce the 
immigration laws.  
 
III. Beyond the Litigation   
 
a. Implementation and Legitimacy  
 
Had the U.S. Supreme Court reached a decision, DHS would 
                                                          
72 Brief for Respondent, supra note 41, at 17. 
73 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 37, at 17. 
74 See Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Response, In Defense of DACA, Deferred 
Action, and the DREAM Act, 91 Tex. L. Rev. 59 (2013); see generally Heckler v. 
Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985); U.S. v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996). 
75 Heckler, 470 U.S. at 832.   
76 See e.g., Ana Gonzalez-Barrera & Jens Manuel Krogstad, U.S. deportations of 
immigrants reach record high in 2013, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Oct. 2, 2014), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/10/02/u-s-deportations-of-
immigrants-reach-record-high-in-2013/.   
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have had a limited window to operationalize the deferred action 
programs and furthermore would have been required to achieve the 
right level of public acceptability and legitimacy. In a piece by 
scholar Ming H. Chen on the role of legitimacy and executive action 
and in the context of the Texas litigation, she notes:  
 
[I]f public confidence in the expanded DACA and 
DAPA programs begins to unravel, it will not likely 
be the result of a judicial pronouncement of 
illegality. It will instead be the result of the 
legitimacy concerns unveiled by the argument about 
the executive branch as a legitimate, fair, and 
trustworthy source of institutional authority.”77  
 
Moving forward and correctly, Chen urges us to focus on 
“legitimacy” as opposed to just the “legality” of executive action, 
which from a functional standpoint may matter most in determining 
how states react and recognize the program. Joseph Landau explains 
how the Executive can enhance this legitimacy through 
“bureaucratic buy-in.” 78 He describes how connecting the 
discretionary decisionmaking between front line officers in cases 
may legitimize the DACA Plus and DAPA programs in meaningful 
ways.79   
 
b. Family Separation and Enforcement Priorities  
 
Beyond the litigation is the still operational Administration’s 
                                                          
77 See Ming Chen, Beyond Legality: The Legitimacy of Executive Action in 
Immigration Law, 66 SYRACUSE L. REV. 87, 142 (2016). 
78Joseph Landau, Bureaucratic Administration: Experimentation and 
Immigration Law, 65 DUKE L.J. 1173, 1225 (2016) (“In short, bureaucratic buy-
in could supply DACA and DAPA with an added - and needed - measure of 
legitimacy. Indeed, presidential administrations should not refrain from touting 
the extent to which across-the-board enforcement policies are consistent not only 
with decades of agency guidelines, but also enforcement decisions rendered on 
the ground.”). 
79 Id. at 1173-1240. 
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priorities memo or third policy described above.80 In the wake of the 
non-decision in United States v. Texas, the current Administration 
has a limited window during which to implement existing 
prosecutorial discretion tools, including but not limited to the policy 
outlined in the Johnson Memo.81 Every Dreamer82 and parent who 
would have qualified for DACA Plus or DAPA is not an 
enforcement priority and therefore should not be targeted for 
enforcement by DHS. Such individuals may also qualify for another 
type of prosecutorial discretion like a stay of removal, parole or 
deferred action.83 For example, a parent and primary caregiver to 
three U.S. citizen children could request deferred action with 
USCIS.84 Importantly, individuals who qualify for DACA 2012 may 
still request deferred action using the pre-existing form and 
procedures outlined by DHS.85 Finally, individuals who present 
other sympathetic factors should be informed about the 
humanitarian factors outlined in existing policy86 and weigh the 
risks and possibilities of making an affirmative request.  
 
Data obtained from USCIS in 2016 provides a snapshot of 
186 deferred action cases and confirms the agency’s continued 
                                                          
80 Johnson Memo re: Policies, supra note 3. 
81 See Johnson Memo re: Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 10. 
82 Individuals who would have qualified for DACA Plus. 
83 See e.g., Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Beyond Deportation: Prosecutorial 
Discretion Requests after U.S. v. Texas, ACSBLOG (June 28, 2016), 
https://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/beyond-deportation-prosecutorial-discretion-
requests-after-us-v-texas. 
84 Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Standard Operating Procedure for Deferred Action 
(non-DACA) (2015), available at  
https://works.bepress.com/shoba_wadhia/36/  
85 Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), supra note 
8. 
86 See Johnson Memo re: Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 10; Meissner 
Memo, supra note 68; Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 
Prosecutorial Discretion: Certain Victims, Witnesses, and Plaintiffs (June 17, 
2011), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/domestic-
violence.pdf; see also Wadhia, supra note 83. 
36 IMMGR. & NAT’LITY L. REV. 94 (2015). 
 
119 
 
practice of deferred action.87 Of the 185 deferred action requests 
provided in this data collection that were made between 2012-2015, 
sixty-five were granted, forty-three were denied and seventy-seven 
were labeled as “no action.” Notably, the reasons for a deferred 
action grant were largely humanitarian and included both serious 
medical issues as well as family support requests. Deferred action 
may be a viable option for those affected by the Texas litigation and 
others who present sympathetic factors.88  
Co-existing with the Administration’s use of prosecutorial 
discretion to protect individuals and families from deportation for 
humanitarian reasons is the discretion used to enforce the 
immigration laws against those labeled as “enforcement priorities.”  
Throughout, and beyond this litigation, DHS has continued to apply 
the Priorities Memo to individuals who appear to fall within the new 
priorities. This Priorities Memo has also sparked, or at least 
facilitated, a series of enforcement actions or immigration raids and 
deportations against Central American parents and children who fit 
within the Priorities Memo.89  This created a firestorm of press and 
fear in communities and shattered the President’s own commitment 
to keeping families together through prosecutorial discretion.90 As 
described in a highly critical editorial by the New York Times:  
                                                          
87 Letter from Jill A. Eggleston, Director FOIA Operations, U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services, to author (Jan. 19, 2016) (unpublished FOIA response 
enclosed) (on file with author); For a comprehensive analysis of the data set see, 
Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Aftermath of United States v. Texas: 
Rediscovering Deferred Action, Yale Journal on Regulation, Notice and 
Comment (Aug. 10, 2016) http://yalejreg.com/nc/the-aftermath-of-united-states-
v-texas-rediscovering-deferred-action-by-shoba-sivaprasad-wadhia/  
88 Wadhia, supra note 83. 
89 Johnson Memo re: Policies, supra note 3. 
90 See e.g., Gustavo Valdes, U.S. raids target Central American immigrants, CNN 
(Jan. 5, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/01/05/us/immigration-raids-central-
americans/; Lisa Rein, U.S. authorities begin raids, taking 121 illegal immigrants 
into custody over the weekend, WASH. POST (Jan. 4, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/federal-eye/wp/2016/01/04/u-s-
authorities-begin-raids-taking-121-illegal-immigrants-into-custody-over-the-
weekend/.  
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…ICE has been running amok, raiding homes and 
public spaces in search of deportable youths. In 
North Carolina and Georgia, where organized 
advocacy is sparse, the dragnet has been unusually 
aggressive. Agents seized students at home and on 
their way to school. Appalled teachers, students and 
community leaders have been signing petitions and 
marching, pleading for justice and putting a human 
face on the victims of coldblooded policies: Wildin 
Acosta, still in detention, as his appeal proceeds. 
Kimberly Pineda-Chavez, arrested on her way to 
school. Yefri Sorto-Hernandez, arrested at his school 
bus stop.91 
 
Possibly, these raids enabled the Administration to showcase to the 
high Court and the public that it does enforce the immigration laws, 
and far from acting arbitrarily, targets its limited resources towards 
the listed priorities.92 But for immigration advocates on the ground, 
these raids highlight a policy that runs afoul of the Administration’s 
express commitment to use prosecutorial discretion wisely and keep 
families together.93  
 
IV. Beyond Deportation: The Broader Context  
                                                          
91 Editorial Board, The Dark Side of Immigration Discretion, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 
20, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/20/opinion/the-dark-side-of-
immigration-discretion.html.  
92 See e.g., Dara Lind, The nationwide immigration raids targeting Central 
American Families, explained, VOX (Jan. 4, 2016, 1:28PM), 
http://www.vox.com/2015/12/28/10673452/deportation-central-american-
immigrant-families; Families in Fear: The Atlanta Immigration Raids, S. 
POVERTY L. CTR., https://www.splcenter.org/20160128/families-fear-atlanta-
immigration-raids (last visited June 11, 2016).  
93 See The Dark Side of Immigration Discretion, supra note 91; see also Ghita 
Schwarz, Obama’s Two-Faced Immigration Policy, CTR. CON. RTS., 
https://ccrjustice.org/home/blog/2016/04/21/obama-s-two-faced-immigration-
policy (last visited June 11, 2016).  
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My preoccupation with prosecutorial discretion began as a 
law student in summer 1998, I began working for a boutique 
immigration law firm in Washington D.C. During my years there I 
met noncitizens from all over the globe seeking refuge from 
persecution abroad; opportunities to continue research at an 
internationally renowned institution; and relief from deportation 
(removal) to remain with their families in the United States; among 
others. The most compelling cases I handled as a lawyer involved 
prosecutorial discretion. I later spent six years with an advocacy 
organization committed to comprehensive immigration reform but 
also challenged by the sharp reaction to the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001, which resulted in many immigration policies 
with far reaching consequences for Arab, Muslim and South Asian 
communities and with minimal attention to or understanding for the 
role of prosecutorial discretion in immigration cases.  When I joined 
Penn State Law in 2008, the study of prosecutorial discretion 
emerged as a natural calling for my research and culminated into 
several law reviews and my first book: Beyond Deportation: The 
Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Cases. 
 
Beyond Deportation is organized into eight chapters –one 
discusses the immigration case of John Lennon and the efforts 
undertaken by his attorney, Leon Wildes, to encourage the immigra-
tion agency to publish its policies about prosecutorial discretion. 
The Lennon case is significant because it triggered the publication 
of the immigration agency’s first guidance on “deferred action,” 
showcased most recently with the President’s executive actions.  
The book provides a detailed history of “deferred action” and how 
it has been applied to individuals and special populations like vic-
tims of domestic violence, sexual assault, and other crimes. The 
book scrutinizes thousands of deferred action cases and identifies a 
pattern for the types of cases that are processed and granted deferred 
action. In the last fifty years, people have received deferred action 
for largely humanitarian reasons including: Long term presence in 
the United States; Serious medical condition or a primary caregiver 
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to a person with a serious medical condition; U.S. citizen family 
members; and/or Advanced or tender age.94 
 
 Much of the deferred action data analyzed in my book was 
obtained through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). In the 
early years of my FOIA adventures, the data was in some cases 
disorganized, illegible, and elusive. Even obtaining illegible data 
was remarkably exhausting and sometimes involved multiple 
communications with FOIA officers, government attorneys, and the 
DHS’s own ombudsman. But the challenge was not limited to the 
shield held by the agency over the information itself or questions to 
myself about whether practitioners and scholars should have to file 
a FOIA to obtain basic information on topics like how to file a 
deferred action request.95 The challenges were more complex 
because some of the data I sought was simply not tracked by the 
agency. As one example and as a result of a FOIA lawsuit with ICE 
over deferred action cases, ICE confirmed that it did not track 
deferred action cases before 2012.96  
 
My own experiences in seeking and sorting data inform the 
book’s discussion about transparency. Transparency in 
prosecutorial discretion matters because it improves the possibility 
that justice will be served for people whose roots and presence are 
in the United States. Transparency also promotes other 
administrative law values like consistency, efficiency, and public 
acceptability. I commend DHS for advancing these values through 
DACA—by creating a program that is transparent and aimed at 
protecting young people. Beyond Deportation closes with praise for 
DACA but is replete with recommendations to the general deferred 
action program, which continues to lack a form, lacks specific 
criteria, or even instructions on how to apply.  DHS should 
formalize the deferred action program and centralize the processing 
                                                          
94 Wadhia, supra note 1. 
95 Wadhia, supra note 84. 
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of all cases at USCIS to promote consistency, uniformity, and 
efficiency. These values serve as the premise for why I recommend 
notice and comment rulemaking or, in the alternative, a broad 
deferred action program assembled with more formality like the 
DACA program.97 
 
Importantly, my recommendation for codifying deferred 
action as a regulation pre-date the current litigation landscape and 
are unrelated to arguments espoused by Texas. As I explained in an 
earlier comment:  
 
Long before the current litigation and unrelated to the 
arguments espoused in Texas I have supported the 
use of notice and comment rulemaking for the 
longstanding deferred action program (pre-dating 
DACA or DAPA) or, in the alternative, a program 
assembled with more formality like the 2012 DACA 
program. But my recommendation for codifying 
deferred action reacts to a significant historical 
absence of transparency and information about the 
general deferred action program. No one could 
suggest that the current DAPA program suffers from 
a lack of transparency. Also important is the 
difference between mandatory rulemaking required 
by the APA and “voluntary” rulemaking that is 
permissive—a distinction and discussion that has 
had no real space in the current political landscape.98  
 
                                                          
97 Wadhia, supra note 1, at 146-156. 
98 Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia,  Notice and Comment Rulemaking in United States 
v. Texas, ACSBLOG (April 15, 2016), https://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/notice-
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Notably and unlike the secrecy that lines the traditional deferred 
action program, DACA 2012 was announced by the President 
himself in the White House Rose Garden with great fanfare.99 Two 
years later, the President made a national and televised 
announcement about his plans to roll out executive actions on 
immigration, including extended DACA and DAPA.100 What 
followed was a rigorous and controversial debate about the policy, 
politics and legality of the President’s actions. 
 
Beyond rulemaking, Beyond Deportation also calls on DHS 
to create a form for deferred action requests, and to require a user 
fee for processing the form. DHS should provide a written 
notification of receipt and the outcome to each applicant or his or 
her attorney.  DHS should also make available to the public statistics 
about all deferred action cases. Outside of the DACA program, DHS 
continues to keep data about deferred action under wraps and only 
partially obtainable through FOIA.  
 
As to the broader prosecutorial discretion policy, Beyond 
Deportation calls on DHS to look at the whole person when making 
prosecutorial discretion decisions. Since the unleashing of the now 
rescinded Morton Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion on June 17, 
2011, immigration advocates and attorneys have pointed to 
instances where DHS failed to implement its own guidelines or, 
alternatively, failed to create a policy that makes it possible for a 
person with a specific indiscretion but strong humanitarian equities 
to be protected from removal through a favorable exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion.101 As an illustration, DACA, established in 
2012, disqualifies individuals who have been convicted of a felony, 
                                                          
99 Wadhia, supra note 1, at 88-108. 
100 BARACK OBAMA, PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., REMARKS BY THE 
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“significant misdemeanor” or three “non-significant” 
misdemeanors.102 Data obtained from ICE on individual deferred 
action cases outside of the DACA program reveals that a significant 
number of denials are driven by having a criminal history.103 
Likewise, immigration advocates and attorneys have featured the 
stories of deported individuals like Pastor Max Friesen, a husband 
and father to United States citizen children104 and published related 
reports about those “denied” prosecutorial discretion because of a 
criminal history.105 Together, these events have created a picture 
where only people with compelling equities and no criminal record 
will receive the temporary benefit of prosecutorial discretion. The 
application of the more recent priorities memo only affirms this 
sentiment.  
Historically however, having a criminal record has not been 
fatal to a prosecutorial discretion grant. As detailed in Beyond 
Deportation and thanks to the groundbreaking research conducted 
by Leon Wildes (who also authored the foreword for the book), the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) routinely processed 
and granted deferred action cases for individuals with a wide range 
of criminal activities—turpitudinous, drug-related, and fraud-
related. As described by Mr. Wildes: “In sum, [deferred action] has 
been granted to those who have violated almost any provision of the 
Act.”106 Indeed, the agency had a history of protecting imperfect 
people with strong humanitarian equities through prosecutorial 
                                                          
102 Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), supra note 
8, at #guidelines. 
103 Wadhia, supra note 1, at 54-87. 
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Keep Him In U.S., HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 20, 2015), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/03/20/max-villatoro-deported-
_n_6911610.html. 
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discretion and deferred action in particular. Many of the elements 
showcased by DHS in recent years as particularly positive qualities: 
presence of family in the United States, residence in the United 
States since childhood and role as a primary caregiver, among 
others, resemble the equities long used by INS and DHS in 
processing individual requests for prosecutorial discretion and 
deferred action in particular.107  
Beyond Deportation also includes specific recommendations 
for when prosecutorial discretion should be exercised. Discretion 
should be exercised early in the process. As described earlier, 
discretionary decisions can be made at many stages that include 
prior to arrest, interrogation, detention, removal (deportation) 
proceedings and even after a removal order has been entered. While 
the various guidance documents suggest an early-stage enforcement, 
there is good reason to believe that many people are placed into the 
system or charged before prosecutorial discretion is considered.108 
 
Beyond Deportation also calls on DHS to adopt a national 
policy that confirms through clear guidance how filing a Notice to 
Appear can serve as a favorable act of prosecutorial discretion. To 
summarize, the Notice to Appear or “NTA” is the charging 
document utilized by DHS to trigger removal proceedings against a 
noncitizen who is alleged to be in violation of the immigration law. 
The idea of treating the filing of such documents as a “positive” act 
of prosecutorial discretion may seem counterintuitive especially 
when compared against how this kind of discretion works in the 
criminal context but for some noncitizens this choice can be life 
changing. For the undocumented individual who is potentially 
eligible for relief like cancellation of removal, filing a Notice to 
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Appear allows her to explain to an immigration judge how her 
longtime residence, good standing, and compelling hardship to a 
qualifying relative satisfy her burden for lasting relief.109 For the 
Central American mom who might otherwise be deported rapidly 
through reinstatement,110 a filed Notice to Appear enables her to see 
an immigration judge and be afforded a fair hearing and the right to 
apply for relief like adjustment of status (green card) or asylum.111  
 
Beyond Deportation recommends that individuals who 
request prosecutorial discretion should be provided written notice 
and should have a mechanism for review, particularly when the 
denial is made without a rational explanation or departs from the 
Department’s own policy.112 Currently, there exists no formal 
mechanism through which an individual or applicant can appeal a 
prosecutorial discretion denial.113  
 
Prosecutorial discretion is an important tool in immigration 
law that can preserve precious resources for the government while 
protecting those with strong roots and equities inside the United 
States. As Beyond Deportation shows, several changes to the 
government’s current prosecutorial discretion policy can and should 
be examined after the politics pervading any meaningful debate 
subsides. Importantly however, prosecutorial discretion cannot 
serve as a substitute for broader legislative reforms. Only Congress 
can enact a comprehensive solution that enables millions of people 
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110 Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (2012). 
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without immigration status to come out of the shadows and be 
placed on a path to security and eventual citizenship.114  
 
By the same token, prosecutorial discretion will continue to 
be a powerful sword even after immigration reform becomes a 
reality. Not every person with a compelling situation or deemed a 
“low priority” for enforcement will meet the affirmative 
requirements for a future legalization program. In this way, the 
humanitarian and political reasons behind prosecutorial discretion 
are in the same breath related and distinct. Each year Congress fails 
to enact a holistic immigration system that channels people arriving 
or residing in the United States from underground and into the rule 
of law, humanitarian cases swell, requiring DHS to use prosecutorial 
discretion as a temporary solution for those with compelling 
equities. However, individuals and families with equities like U.S. 
Citizen dependents, a medical condition or intellectual promise may 
be ineligible for a legislative solution perhaps because of an 
indiscretion that make him or her inadmissible or because the person 
lacks the requisite number of years of presence to apply for a legal 
status. Consequently, prosecutorial discretion and comprehensive 
immigration reform cannot be viewed as “either or” options.  
 
As lawyers, scholars and lawmakers grapple with the wave 
of headlines or questions faced by the courts on the question of 
prosecutorial discretion, I hope this article and my book provides a 
deeper understanding for the historical role of ,and legal foundation 
for, prosecutorial discretion in immigration cases and the extent to 
which compassion has served as the foundation for how such 
decisions are made. 
                                                          
114 Id. at 5-6. 
